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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines whether a Decision Support System (DSS) could be of practical
assistance to the U. S. Navy's shipboard Tactical Action Officer (TAO). The environment
of the TAO is one of tension and information overload as he monitors the data coming in
from sensors and other watchstanders and attempts to determine the tactical situation from
these clues. The thesis begins with the assumption that in order to help the TAO perform
his duties and reach a correct analysis of the developing tactical picture, a knowledge-based
DSS could be developed to assist him by figuring out the identity of, and associated threat
presented by each contact and to help him remember what the identity so far has been.
Through a series of interviews of qualified TAOs, a set of requirements for such a system
was developed. The results were analyzed and the subsequent design made to include
analytic capabilities, Rules of Engagement recommendations, and a trackball interface
featuring pull-down menus and familiar symbology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This first chapter will provide the reader with an overview of the duties and
environment of the Tactical Action Officer (TAO), and describe how a Decision Support
System (DSS) may be of potential benefit to the TAO.
A. BACKGROUND
1 . The Environment and Duties of the Tactical Action Officer
The environment of the U. S. Navy's Tactical Action Officer (TAO) is one of
stress, potential information overload, doubt, and sometimes confusion. It is the TAO who
is charged with the awesome responsibility of fighting the ship, employing the ship's
weapons against aggressor platforms in the Captain's absence.
In the days of World War I, the Commanding Officer fought his ship from the
bridge where he visually identified the enemy and decided on the appropriate engagement
method. Then came wars fought under the cover of darkness — wars fought with weapons
other than cannon — wars fought without ever sighting the enemy.
Electronic detection became prevalent in World War II with the advent of surface
search and air search radar and sonar. These devices not only provided non-visual target
detection for the originator, but eventually were used to locate, identify, and target the
emitting platform.
In today's high-tech world of phased-array radars, electronic surveillance
methods, smart weapons, and multiple threats, war at sea is becoming increasingly
complex. The Commanding Officer afloat needs help in discharging his responsibilities, he
needs a highly trained watch officer prepared to advise him and fight the ship in his
absence. Such an individual is the TAO.
When engaged in fighting the ship (sometimes just in keeping track of the tactical
picture), the TAO experiences stress and sometimes an overload of information. Such
stressful situations may threaten the ship, her crew, and her ability to carry out her mission.
2 . Evolution of the At-Sea Tactical Situation
The TAO gathers information about the contacts he encounters: size information,
data about their electronic emissions, speed information, and finally configuration
information gained through visual sighting by lookout or friendly aircraft. From these
inputs the TAO tries to narrow down the possible identity of these contacts in order to keep
track of the developing tactical situation.
Despite the doubt inherent in the TAO environment mentioned earlier, some
TAOs will stick stubbornly to a decision they have made, no matter how unfounded this
decision may be. This phenomenon is probably the result of a combination of factors, lack
of sleep, stress, difficult subordinates whose attitudes makes the TAO even more adamant,
and the tendency of the position ofTAO to sometimes force the decision simply because he
is the boss (I'm the TAO, and if I say it's a Krivak, then it's a Krivak). This can be
dangerous and, in fact, potentially disastrous. Staw points out that because it is often
possible for persons who have suffered a setback to recoup their losses through an even
greater commitment of resources to the same course of action, a cycle of escalating
commitment can be produced. [Staw 81 p. 577] By design, a DSS would reduce/eliminate
this problem by offering another expert opinion and by allowing the TAO a graceful, face-
saving way out of a bad decision. Computers, after all, are seldom smart-alec and difficult
to get along with.
It is conceivable that if an automated decision aid had existed aboard the USS
Stark in the Persian Gulf, that disastrous situation could have been avoided. From the time
the Stark "was warned of the approach of an Iraqi F-l Mirage by an E-3 airborne warning
and control system (AWACS) aircraft" [Vlahos 88 p. 64-65] at 2000 local time until the F-
l's "first missile was launched at 2107, 22.5 nautical miles from the Stark" the aircraft had
closed a total distance of about 175 nautical miles, "locked onto the Stark" with its Cyrano
IV air intercept radar, changed course to "a virtual constant bearing, decreasing range" path
now coming right at the Stark, and fired two Exocet missiles. Stark's TAO forbade
contacting the aircraft by radio until after the first missile had been launched. After the
second missile had been fired the Phalanx Gatling gun was placed in 'standby mode'" and
"permission was given at this time to arm the super rapid blooming offboard chaff
(SRBOC) launchers." Evidently, despite all of the indications of the F-l's intentions, his
hostile intent was never recognized. The added information and advice a DSS could have
provided might have led to a better decision about the interpretation of the tactical situation
at hand and to a better reaction on the part of the TAO to defend his ship.
B . OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
This paper describes research conducted to determine whether a micro- or mini-
computer-based Decision Support System would be useful to the TAO in analyzing the
input data, sorting the contacts by eliminating those which do not fit the data, and keeping
track of what the contact could possibly be and presenting this information to the TAO. In
effect, the system would act as an "analytic scratchpad."
The specific objectives of this thesis work were to:
• determine if a Knowledge-Based DSS could be helpful to the TAO for:
a. determining the identities of other platforms
b. remembering these identities for the TAO
c. recommending courses of action
If the above proved feasible, to:
• analyze the specific requirements for such a system
• design a system to meet the need
C . BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
The advantages of such a system arise from the DSS's ability to determine from the
input data the type of contact and to keep track of this information for the TAO to free his
mind for other things.
A further advantage is seen in the very nature of a computer -- it is dispassionate and
unemotional, and it does not become stressed. By allowing it to make these cool, calm,
unbiased analyses, the Navy benefits by not having a stress-induced misjudgment on the
part of some TAO cause the ship to take a missile hit.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
It is important to note that the system designed was set up not as a reaction tool for the
crisis environment of a "shooting war" - it will not take over from a panic-stricken TAO
and defend the ship or even advise him when the chips are already down. Rather, it will
act as an advisor during the DEVELOPING tactical situation. It will take data input, and
evaluate it based on the information in a platform database which meets the given criteria.
It was assumed that the TAOs at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) generally
reflect the overall opinions of the TAOs at sea and that the school's influence on these
students had not dulled or distorted their professional opinions due to their absence from
the fleet. Further research might be required to confirm that, in fact, the cutting edge TAOs
of the fleet do agree with the design specifications produced as a result of this survey.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A survey of those qualified TAOs available at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
was conducted to determine what they thought might be the most beneficial means of
supporting the TAO in such an environment. These TAOs were interviewed by the author
with a guideline set of questions to structure the interview (Appendix A). These guidelines
were developed based on prior research in the DSS arena, although little of this research
actually dealt with real world situations. Rather, it discussed mostly theoretical applications
to a proposed area.
Although the use of questionnaires was considered for those unable to be scheduled
for an interview, none were used, due to the extra information and different insights more
likely to evolve in an interview than in a structured questionnaire and due to the complexity
of the questions themselves and the possible resulting misinterpretation.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The thesis is organized into five chapters. This first chapter is the introduction which
has described the duties and environment of the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and how a
DSS may be of potential benefit to the TAO. The second chapter explores the theory behind
Decision Support Systems and Expert Systems in general and those specifically tailored to
the emergency/crisis environment (previous attempts at this specific problem domain). The
third chapter describes the TAO environment as it relates to the above theoretical basis, the
research actually conducted as it related to this environment and the problem presented.
The fourth chapter discusses the interview results and the design of the resulting system.
Finally, the fifth chapter presents further potential research possibilities and discusses
conclusions and recommendations drawn from this research.
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE RESEARCH
In order to properly answer whether the Decision Support System (DSS) is
appropriate for the environment of the TAO, it is necessary first to examine the theory
behind DSS and their relatives Expert Systems (ES) and Knowledge-Based DSS. It is also
incumbent on a researcher in this field to take a serious look at previous attempts to assist
the crisis manager with these tools.
A. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Much literature exists on the subject of Decision Support Systems (DSS). This chapter
condenses the essence of the literature to describe a Decision Support System. Such an
understanding will be necessary to determine whether this is an appropriate solution to the
problem experienced by the TAO. The results come from a variety of sources, including
actual experiments with DSS in crisis situations.
There is, as Hopple points out, a tendency to use DSS where they are not really
appropriate. He compares this to the law of the hammer, "Give a child a hammer, and s/he
will use it on everything encountered." He warns against methidolatry, which manifests
itself at the most general level as the fetishistic belief that computer-based decision aids are
appropriate solutions to (and potential panaceas for) every analytical and decision problem
or task that confronts a command and control problem solver. [Hopple 86 p. 948-949)
With this warning in mind, an examination of decision aids is in order.
Ford defines a Decision Support System (DSS) as "something that helps decision-
makers utilize data and models to solve unstructured or semi-structured problems." [Ford
85 p. 21-22]. It is a highly touted tool for analyzing problems prior to decision making.
The computer's adeptness at manipulating data through storage, retrieval, arithmetic
operations, and comparison makes it well suited to the operations desired by humans.
Sprague and Carlson define DSS as "computer-based systems that help decision
makers confront ill- structured problems through direct interaction with data and analysis
models." [Sprague & Carlson 82 p. 1] This is a different arena from that of Management
Information Systems (MIS). As Sprague points out, MIS has an "information focus,
aimed at middle managers. Its structured information flow and integration by function
(i.e., production, marketing, etc.) provide inquiry and report generation, usually with a
database." [Sprague 87 p. 198] With a DSS, the emphasis is on enhancing the quality of
decisions.
Though each of these definitions seems to be aiming at the same area of computer
support, there appears to be no concrete definition of a Decision Support System to allow
direct comparison and contrasting with MIS. This thesis will use a more general
description based on the components of the name, due to the simplicity it lends to the
concept. Keen points out that the system can be broken into its component parts and
described in terms of a computer-based system to support the making of decisions [Keen
87 p. 259]. A distinction should be made here ~ a DSS is not designed to replace the
decision-maker but rather to help him make the decision by presenting the information in a
different format or with a different evaluation of the situation.
DSS are suitable for many diverse decision areas including financial planning, train
dispatching, and marketing strategies. They are particularly adept in situations requiring a
different representation or a sorting of data prior to its being useful to the decision-maker.
This different representation may take the form of a graphical display like a pie chart or may
involve sensitivity analysis (What if?) capability or both. In fact, DSS take many different
forms. They may simply graph certain data as they relate to other data, they may contain
formulae to calculate the optimal investment portfolio for a given set of financial data and
priorities, or they may help the decision maker by allowing a particular simulation to be run
with various combinations of input data. DSS are not just being tested and used by
computer companies, either, they are being used by pharmaceutical companies, railroads,
and paper giants and even tested by law enforcement agencies.
B. EXPERT SYSTEMS
A new variation, the Expert System (ES), is a computer-based system to emulate the
judgment and reasoning of an expert. If an expert could be corralled and induced to tell his
secrets, the process of his thoughts could be modeled in the form of a rule-based computer
program. Morton points out that there is an "ES onus on cognitive processes underlying the
notion of expertise." [Morton 88 p. 17] In other words, the ES tries to mimic the thought
patterns and processes through a rule-based set of instructions for the computer to perform
given a particular set of circumstances. Although the systems differ in that the DSS was
designed to help the decision-maker decide and the ES was designed to make the decision,
Ford points out that the "fundamental goal of DSS and ES is the same; they seek to
improve the quality of the decision." [Ford 85 p. 24] Mason goes on to point out that"[An
Expert System's] output is a single course of action. The decision-maker retains just a
'veto' power." [Mason 69 p. 87]
Expert Systems are probably best described as an evolution of DSS. Some would
even argue that an ES is an intelligent DSS [Turbin & Watkins 86 p. 139]. Ford defines
ES as a "problem-solving program that achieves good performance in a specialized problem
domain that generally requires specialized knowledge and skill. The systems process the
knowledge of experts and attempt to mimic their thinking, skill, and intuition." [Ford 85
p. 23]
Waterman and Jenkins go on to point out that an expert system is "particularly useful
for problem domains that are not well formalized and for which no generally agreed upon
axioms or theorems exist." [Waterman & Jenkins 86 p. 96]
An expert system is often made up of two components: a rule base which contains the
"rules of thinking" and the inference engine which uses the rules to infer a conclusion.
1 . Rule Base
The rule base of an Expert System is the set of instructions given to the system to
determine what action it is to take or what conclusion it is to draw given a certain set of
circumstances. The rule base represents the knowledge of the expert, put into a set of "if-
then" rules for the system to follow in a certain situation. The rule base is the codification
of the knowledge that the system is to possess. It is the written out form of the expertise
the Expert System is to mimic when presented with a certain problem or a certain set of
problems.
2 . Inference Engine
The inference engine is the heart of an Expert System, performing two major
tasks. According to Harmon and King, "it first examines existing facts and rules [in the
rule base], and adds new facts when possible. Second, it decides the order in which
inferences are made. In doing so, the inference engine conducts the consultation with the
user." [Harmon & King 85 p. 49] Sage points out that the inference engine also acts "as
an intelligent interpreter in the selection of those portions of the knowledge base which are
most applicable to resolution of a given issue." [Sage 86 p. 197] One of the advantages of
such a setup is the system's ability to generate an explanation of the reasoning process used
to reach a conclusion. The user is then able to validate the conclusion and possibly enhance
his decision-making skills by following the system's line of reasoning.
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Several operations are involved with 'firing' the rule base including (1) forward
and backward chaining, (2) depth and breadth searches, and (3) monotonic and non-
monotonic reasoning. In forward chaining, the inference engine takes existing data (facts,
sensor inputs, and the like) and examines the premises for rules to see if they are true, thus
moving toward a conclusion. [Harmon & King 85] It is best suited for situations where
the solution needs to be constructed, usually from a large number of possible outcomes.
Backward chaining, on the other hand, starts with a conclusion (diagnosis, goal, etc.) and
works back through the subgoals to choose an answer. Backward chaining is commonly
used when the possible outcomes are known and are reasonably small in number.
Waterman and Jenkins describe this in terms of rules and goals. "The rules are
antecedent driven. This means that when all the conditions of a rule are true relative to the
database, the rule 'fires' causing the associated actions to be taken. The goals, however,
are consequent driven. This means that the system is given a condition to make true, or in
effect, a question to answer through deductive inference. Here, the right sides or
consequents of rules are examined to find one that could make the desired condition true.
When such a rule is found, its left side or antecedent is examined to see if all its conditions
are true. If they are, the rule is fired." [Waterman & Jenkins 86 p. 100]
A depth-first search of the knowledge base follows a detailed line of reasoning
concentrating on highly related facts. A breadth-first search sweeps across all premises in a
rule before digging for greater detail. [Harmon & King 85]
Monotonic reasoning involves "locking" previously validated premises, that is,
once the system accepts a premise as true, it cannot reverse the logic. Non-monotonic
reasoning is more flexible in that the system can reverse accepted premises when contrary
information is presented. The major drawback to such a capability is that the inference
engine must be able to undo all premises based on the invalid premise.
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C. CAN DSS AND ES WORK TOGETHER?
Sage contends that "there should exist many areas in which the proper form of
knowledge-based support is a hybrid of an 'expert system' and a 'decision support
system.'" This is to allow it to "support the decision maker in the formulation or framing
of the decision situation in the sense of recognizing needs, identifying appropriate
objectives by which to measure successful resolution of an issue, and generating alternative
courses of action that may resolve the needs and satisfy objectives." [Sage 86 p. 196]
This idea of the use of DSS in concert with ES is not a new one. Henderson finds that
a productive synergy can and should exist between research in the two domains
[Henderson 87]. Turban and Watkins go on to point out that the combination of the two in
an actual application would not only be able to answer the question "what-if?" but "will
also be able to answer the question 'why?'" [Turban & Watkins 86 p. 150].
As the two systems become intertwined, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate where
one stops and the other begins. This is not to say that the two are mutually exclusive.
Shane et al. "test" the efficacy of using a decision support system with an expert system
component." The results of their study "indicate that using Knowledge-Based DSS can
improve the decision maker's ability to identify and assess problems in unstructured
environments." [Shane et al. 86 p. 453]
We have examined the concepts and uses of DSS and ES as separate entities. DSS fit
well into an environment where the decision-maker requires assistance in making the
decision, while the ES replaces the decision-maker and comes up with the answer itself.
The environment of the TAO does not call for replacement of the TAO, yet there is a
tremendous amount of expertise for him to master, a huge amount of information to track,
12
and sometimes a very short time in which to make a decision. A sort of hybrid may be in
order.
D. KNOWLEDGE-BASED DSS
Based on the intended use of the TAO system, the term Knowledge-Based DSS is
preferred since the system will be used to provide an expert decision based on its embedded
knowledge. But, as will be seen, this information is used in an advisory role only. Goul
and Tonge discuss the Knowledge-Based variation on the DSS theme. "Our perception is
that the term incorporates (1) the application of DSS techniques to expert-based system
construction and (2) expert-based system techniques applied to DSS construction." [Goul
and Tonge 87 p. 451]
The systems apparently came into their own not because their assistance was so perfect
but because as Benbasat et al. point out "people costs are greater than machine costs."
[Benbasat et al. 81 p. 753]. The memory of computers is also advantageous to the user in
that once the system is programmed to assist the decision maker or to emulate the expert, it
can keep track of a number of variables without regard to how many other things are on its
mind and how tense the situation might have become in the interim.
It is on these characteristics of computer operation which this thesis will capitalize:
their speed and their ability to keep track of a number of simultaneous complex activities.
Numerous drawings of what such a system would look like attempt to point out the
various interrelationships among the user, the computer, and the system components
[Harmon & King 85, Sage 86, Ford 85, Arcidiacono 88, and Turban & Watkins 86]. In
order to find a basis to work from on the TAO DSS, these drawings were examined to find
a diagram that best fit the uses and relationships such a system would require. Although
none of these specifically fit the needs of the TAO environment exacdy, two were close and
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Figure 1. The Knowledge-Based DSS
[Adapted from Harmon & King 85: p. 49 and Turban & Watkins 86: p. 139]
This figure illustrates the interaction of the user with the system through the User
Interface. The Justifier, described by Turban and Watkins, is the component that explains
to the user the reasons for a particular conclusion (or interim conclusion) by the system.
This is the same component referred to by Harmon and King as the Explanation
Subsystem. The Blackboard is unique to the Turban and Watkins model and is the
component "for recording intermediate decisions." [Turban & Watkins 86 p. 140] The
Knowledge Base contains factual rules to allow the derivation of assertions. As
Arcidiacono points out, "The Inference Engine uses assertions (facts) and problem solving
expertise in the knowledge base to infer conclusions. Its design and function depends on
types of knowledge structures it must process." [Arcidiacono 88 p. 47] He goes on to
point out an important advantage of having a separate Inference Engine and Knowledge
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Base since "a knowledge base for one domain can be replaced by one from another domain
without the need for changes to the inference engine or user interface." Although this is a
deceptively simple system, it contains the necessary elements to describe the Knowledge-
Based DSS to be considered.
The result of combining DSS and ES into a Knowledge-Based DSS is what
Kronenberg and Howard refer to as "judgment enhancement." They further point out that
"the development of decision support capabilities of the character discussed here must be
responsive to the unique style, priorities, and disposition of the manager." [Kronenberg &
Howard 87 p. 52-53] Huber also notes that a manager's DSS must be compatible with
whatever manual decision support systems (dss) he is already using if the system is to be
used profitably. Huber states that "every manager has a 'decision support system' (a dss, a
system consisting of the information sources and decision aids that the manager draws
upon as the occasion requires)." [Huber 81 p. 1] This dss can take the form of something
as simple as a notepad and pencil. Figure 2 illustrates the necessary relationship among the
decision maker, his dss, and his DSS.
By using the combined DSS and ES advantages in a time-constrained, complex
environment of an emergency, the system will accrue the advantage of a very fast response
to the problem with the additional plus that it can keep track of a number of developing
situations simultaneously. This is done with the hypothesis that these efforts can help the
human TAO to make the decision better, more responsibly, with a decreased level of stress
characteristic of an emergency (discussed later) or of an instance of information overload.
He is provided with a much broader look at all of the possible alternative solutions and
courses of action.
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Figure 2. TAO DSS must be compatible with TAO dss
E. INTERFACE
Additional areas to be pursued by this research include the type of interface which
would best assist the TAO in interacting with the system. As Hurley and Wallace point
out, "Even an 'optimally' designed system may go unused if information is not presented
in a form that supports the decision situation and the style of the user." [Hurley & Wallace
87 p. 168] Several scholars have wrestled with this problem, and numerous interface
possibilities now exist. For example, Liang has even proposed a self-adaptive interface
that watches the pattern of the man-machine interaction and adjusts itself to meet the need.
[Liang 87] Shane et al. arrived at a dual mode system which allowed guided and non-
guided sessions. "The Non-Guided Session is distinguished by the freedom provided the
decision maker to examine file folders at will." They explain that "the sophisticated
decision maker is provided a more facilitative interface." [Shane et al. 86 p. 455]
Another facet to be explored in the realm of the interface is whether the reasoning
process followed by the system to reach the solution presented should be accessible to the
user. The answer appears to be a resounding "yes." As Hurley and Wallace found in their
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1987 study, "When the system's exact reasoning process is available, it is easier to
convince the users that the solutions are valid and reliable." [Hurley & Wallace 87 p. 167]
F. CRISES AND DSS
Kronenberg and Howard point out that "sources of uncertainty and turbulence are
magnified for those who must deal with the unpredictable arenas of defense, foreign
policy, or emergency management." [Kronenberg & Howard 87 p. 49] They propose to
solve this problem with a Decision Support System. They point out that "Crisis decision
making under uncertainty and stress has special requirements. In addition to the
physiological, skill, and experiential requirements of which we hear so much, there are
extraordinary information requirements. The senior manager is called on to sort, validate,
weigh alternatives, and act in an environment which inhibits all those cognitive processes."
At this point, we should define "emergency" in order to clarify the focal point for the
issue. Elam and Isett point out that crises are events that have "no identical precedent on
which to base a routine decision, and their precise characterization is difficult." [Elam &
Isett 87 p. 4] Crises have never occurred before while emergencies have not only occurred
before, but there exist for them contingency plans with which to react. The reader may
consider this an artificial differentiation, but it is one that is relied upon in this research.
According to Smart and Vertinsky, "Designs for crisis decision making attempt to (1)
prevent certain biases that are specific to stressful situations, (2) increase flexibility and
sensitivity of line units, and (3) develop computational and processing capabilities in the
organization to meet sudden increasing demands imposed upon the decision units." [Smart
& Vertinsky 77 p. 655]. This definition seems to suit the emergency situation of the TAO
by aiming at a much better solution to the problem facing the decision maker.
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This thesis will make use of the phases of resolving a decision developed by
Govindaraj et al. "1) uncertainty reduction and 2) threat classification" [Govindaraj et al.
85 p. 499] to apply to the solution of perhaps the most potentially lethal of all emergencies,
the attack by a hostile military force on our own ships.
Further research into the area of such systems for support of decision making in the
crisis arena point out that the decisions made under the stress of such a situation "are
subject to error because the time sensitive nature of the activity prevents consideration of all
of the viable alternatives and precludes thorough investigation of the selected alternatives."
[Benoit et al. 82 p. ix]. The advantages of the use of their system, developed for the U. S.
Air Force included "Thorough consideration of all relevant factors ..., Prompt response to
crisis situations,... [and] Consistent behavior." They go on to point out that their system
"models the human planning process by developing first a set of possible alternatives and
then filling out the details in a series of successive steps." This is the approach that the
TAO DSS will take.
Yet another study performed to determine knowledge requirements for Knowledge-
Based DSS points out that "the decision maker starts with some uncertainty with regard to
the true situation, and then looks for additional information which may reduce this
uncertainty. Following a cyclic process new information is obtained and integrated into the
existing information, the situation is reassessed and if final assessment cannot be made,
further information is requested. The process ends when the decision maker decides that
he knows enough about the situation to make up his mind, or that no additional sources of
information can contribute significantly (compared to their cost) to remove the uncertainty
which still remains." [Ben-Bassat & Freedy 83 p. 1]. This description seems to fit best
the scenario of interest: a developing tactical scenario.
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Ben-Bassat and Freedy point out that "As new findings come in, either as a result of
the decision maker's request or 'voluntarily,' they should be sorted with regard to the entire
battlefield structure, the triggered hypotheses and, on the highest priority, with regard to
the current goals." This assessment cycle is terminated finally by "one of the following
conditions: (a) A decision may be reached ... (b) Several triggered hypotheses have not yet
been settled, however, the cost of removing the remaining uncertainty is relatively high ...
(c) New developments (e.g., sudden enemy attack)." These are also valid points in the at-
sea tactical situation of the TAO.
Ben-Bassat and Freedy continue by saying that the three key things that they feel are
critical to the success of their system are "the elicitation and computer representation of the
necessary military knowledge for battle field reading ... modeling the reasoning and
inference processes which take part during situation assessment, [and] the human-machine
interface." The situation, as they aptly point out, "may basically be considered as a puzzle
building task."
Vedder and Mason found that for law enforcement puzzles their best results were ones
whose human-machine interface featured "sharp, terse dialogue based on the scenario
model of a hostage-taking incident." [Vedder & Mason 87 p. 405]
Despite these difficulties and the complications of solving the puzzle, such systems
have been built. Callero et al. produced a tactical air targeting aid in the form of a rule-
based Expert System. They emphasized the need for the structure of such a system to
"permit rapid adaptation within the operational environment." [Callero et al. 86 p. 190]
They took meticulous care in designing their system to examine the needs of the user,
stating that "At the outbreak of hostilities, the officers cannot be expected to have broad
experience in tactical planning .... clearly [there is] a need for sophisticated, automated aids
to help regularize the process and assist the targeteer in making the best possible selection."
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Klahr et al. produced TWIRL (Tactical Warfare in the ROSS Language), a ground
combat simulation. Their study is particularly interesting for its extensive discussion of the
system's object-oriented framework. In this setup, they explain, "Objects are organized in
a hierarchy of class-subclass links [and] This hierarchy allows an object to inherit
automatically the attributes and behaviors of the classes to which it belongs." They point
out that the "organization of knowledge around objects facilitates modularity, modifiability,
and maintenance of the simulation" and go on to assert that "most behaviors are associated
with classes rather than instances. For our purposes, we are more concerned with the
ability to represent various types of military units than we are with the ability to represent
large quantities of any particular type of unit." [Klahr et al. 86 p. 231] This, too, will
become an important concept in the design of a DSS for TAOs.
G. SUMMARY
DSS are designed to assist decision-makers in doing their jobs, while ES are intended
to replace the decision-maker altogether by automating the process of making the choice. A
marriage between the two results in a Knowledge-Based DSS, one capable of assisting the
decision-maker through its internal database of expertise. This is certainly a field that
deserves further examination, and a number of applications have already been built to allow
these new fields to become available in the crisis decision-making environment. They can
help by unemotionally dispensing the expertise in time of crisis, keeping track of myriad
information for the decision-maker, and speeding up the decision process. It appears to be
a logical choice for a TAO decision aid, but such a conclusion cannot be positively stated
until more specific TAO requirements are characterized.
20
III. DSS APPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY.
A. BACKGROUND
The idea of DSS for military use is not a new one. In 1983, Vice Admiral Samuel
Gravely, USN (Retired) wrote about the Integrated Information Display (IID) System
which was designed to assist the Fleet Commanders-In-Chief (CINC) handle the
voluminous amounts of information to "be collected, correlated, analyzed, and
disseminated." [Gravely 83 p. 53] De Balogh points out that the military, in fact,
developed the concept of "artificial intelligence - artificial instinct" systems, which are
"sensor-based to monitor conditions within a complex environment and communicate a
warning plus initiate immediate societal response within seconds." [De Balogh 85 p. 101]
He also discusses requirements for such a system which would include "A combination of
natural language and icon-based interactive dialog environment, a continuous, systematic
updating effort of major proportions" to keep up with the dynamic environment [De Balogh
85 p. 86] The necessity for continuous, systematic update also exists in the TAO
environment, where the burgeoning array of missiles available is astonishing, and where
the parameters of each are changeable to keep the enemy off guard.
It seems strange that such a helpful tool has not been provided to the shipboard TAO
who deals with much of the same data and has many of the very same information
requirements as the CINC's Operations Duty Officer. Furthermore, the TAO is really
where the rubber meets the road — he's the one controlling the employment of missiles and
other weapons against enemy forces. His need is, if anything, more critical than that of the
shore-based CINCs'.
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There is a danger here, too in that the system provided to a TAO might not fit his
needs. Sage contends that "Perhaps the most damning charges of all that affect potential
user willingness to use the system are the feeling that it significantly interferes with the
'normal' way of thinking about problems, or that it cannot adapt to changes in problem
specifications, or that it does not produce intermediate results of value, or that it does not
really address the actual problems that exist." [Sage 86 p. 202] The importance of design
is evident here ; it is possible to actually make the job harder if the decision aid does not
meet the requirements.
Goul and Tonge point out that critical to the design of any such system "are the needs
and desires of the system user as they influence design." [Goul & Tonge 87 p. 450] They
state that several of the approaches used today completely ignore these crucial elements.
Callero et al. point out that "Human decision making is inherently unstructured" and
suggest "that automated aids specifically designed to reflect the human decision process can
contribute to better judgments." To do this, they favor the "knowledge-engineering
problem-solving approach in which human domain knowledge is essential, and judgment,
experience, and intuition play a larger role than mathematical algorithms and stochastic
formalisms." [Callero et al. 86 p. 186]
Weiss suggests that "perhaps the most powerful reason for the success of the Order of
Battle Version 1 Knowledge Base [OB 1KB], a U. S. Army battlefield advisor, was that the
end user played a key role in scoping, designing, and implementing the system." [Weiss 86
p. 93] She also points out that "Because of the inherent transparency of the logic of the
system operations and the ease of access to information, OB 1KB was used in the field as
an accepted, powerful aid in the decision making process. More importantly, in order to
use OB 1KB, the soldiers did not have to change the way in which they did their job."
[Weiss 86 p. 95]
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Thus, the voice of Huber echoes its warning that in order to be used and useful, the
DSS must be compatible with the manager's dss. The system for a TAO will have to be
flexible and adaptive to his changing environment. Waterman and Jenkins suggest that the
user and the system may actually feed off of each other, improving each other's decision
skills. "On the basis of rules provided by the analysts, the system will reach conclusions
with which the analysts may disagree. In this case, the analysts will be compelled to
reexamine the basis for their deductions, and this may lead to the formulation of new rules
for the system." [Waterman & Jenkins 86 p. 97]
This iterative learning should also be applied to the design of the system's logic.
Courbon et al. describe this as a "methodology based on the progressive design of a DSS,
going through multiple as-short-as-possible cycles, in which successive versions of the
systems under construction are utilized by the end-user." (cited in [Morton 88 p. 14])
Morton distinguishes this approach from prototyping "because the initial system could
actually become the real system, not just a pilot test." [Morton 88 p. 1 1]
To design a system that allows continuous update, that adapts to changes in the
problem, that supports rather than interferes with the "normal" way of doing things, that
produces intermediate results of value, and that is compatible with the TAO's dss is a tall
order. It requires a more thorough understanding of data available to the TAO, information
required by him, and the jobs of the assistants who provide this information.
1. TAO's Principal Assistants
The TAO himself has a number of assistants to help him carry out his duties.
They do this by keeping him informed of the various data which become available aboard
the ship - data which might help to narrow down the identity of the contact. These
assistants range from the Officer of the Deck (OOD) on the bridge of the ship to the




























Figure 3. Information Inflow to the TAO
The Officer of the Deck is in charge of maneuvering the ship but his position
allows him to see a number of things otherwise unavailable to the TAO.
The lookout has an even better view since he is frequently placed higher on the
ship, thus extending his visual range. The lookout is often not experienced enough to
know what he is looking at, but his raw data can still be helpful to those who can interpret
what he reports.
The Signalmen on the signal bridge can send a flashing light message to other
ships to ask them for their identities. This can be valuable even with Soviet ships since a
standard communication procedure accepted by both sides allows for at least rudimentary
communication to indicate one's intentions to avoid collisions. Signalmen are also trained
in the art of visually identifying other men-of-war, as well as merchant ships and pleasure
craft.
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The Operations Specialists (OS) in the ship's Combat Information Center
provide the radar tracking of contacts to determine their course and speed, closest point of
approach, etc. This can be valuable in narrowing the field if a particular contact is observed
proceeding at a speed faster than a class of ship is believed capable of or has a radar return
indicating a larger aircraft than a hostile fighter.
The Sonar Technicians (ST) provide tracking on sonar and can similarly provide
course/speed data and the narrowing of contacts' identities as well as certain tonal data
which emanate from contacts. These "tonals" come from main feed pumps, reduction
gears, etc. and are sometimes distinctive enough to identify a particular class of contact.
Propeller blade rates also can provide identity data through speed of rotation and the actual
count of the number of blades.
The Electronic Warfare specialists can passively listen to the electronic signals
emanating from a particular platform and determine from the combination of signals what
emitters a platform has and therefore what that platform might be. This guess is based on
known data of which classes of ships, submarine, and aircraft carry that particular suite of
emitters. Some of the EW's gear is automated and will determine from the pulse repetition
frequency, jitter, pulse rate, etc. what the platform is while other less automated gear will
merely present the parameters listed above to the ES and allow him to identify it from this
data.
2 . Further Complications
The potential danger of all of the supposedly helpful assistance the TAO is
receiving above is that he is constandy interrupted by the various people who are informing
him of some new tidbit of information to add to his growing collection. These
interruptions cause his analytic train-of-thought to be broken and for information to be lost,
forgotten, or worse yet, to be attributed to the wrong contact, actually worsening and
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further confusing the tactical picture. It is possible that better decisions would result from a
tactical team consisting of the TAO and a TAO DSS to keep track of correlations and to help
deduce answers. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.
This confusion coupled with the TAO's responsibility to brief the Commanding
Officer on the tactical situation, to watch the Officer of the Deck's maneuvers to ensure the
ship is in safe waters, to ensure the ship's weapons systems are unmasked, to manage the
CIC team, and his responsibility to run exercises can further exacerbate the problem of the
TAO's information glut and can cause information to never be correlated or used.
Even in a calm, ideal environment with all information available and all data
flows perfect, there is a problem beyond that of merely correctly identifying neighboring
contacts.
3 . Determining Hostile Intent
The environment of the TAO is further complicated by the fact that even when he
knows the identity of the various contacts, he is still unsure of their intentions. They may
mean his ship harm or they may just be projecting their presence on the high seas and
monitoring the U. S. ships.
To help the TAO through this dilemma, there exists a set of criteria which, when
they are met, may determine that the contact has a so-called "hostile intent."
These criteria include such things as having the missile doors on a contact open
(as viewed by a surveillance aircraft or a member of the ship's company) or radiating a
friendly ship with a fire control radar. The hostile intent may be directed at other friendly

















than with TAO alone
Figure 4. The TAO/ DSS Team
In these situations, a DSS could help by asking the TAO questions relative to a
particular contact's status at the time to determine whether hostile intent is present in his
actions. Yet another complication which comes into play is that the Rules of Engagement
for a particular situation may be entirely different from those for the same situation in
another ocean. These rules are created and invoked by the various fleet commanders under
the direction of the National Command Authorities (the President and the Secretary of
Defense). Those of the Persian Gulf are different from those of the Mediterranean because
of known hostile intent in the Gulf. Here again the DSS could help the situation by
knowing those rules and presenting the appropriate actions for the TAO to carry out for a
given situation.
But, all of this is just conjecture if not backed up by interviews with real TAOs to
determine what would be the most compatible with their collective dss, what would assist
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the "normal" way of examining problems, what information is most needed by the TAO
and when, and what type of interface would be easiest, most effective, and fastest to use.
B . DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH
In order to solicit this information effectively, careful design went into the specific
research approach. Since most TAOs are not familiar with DSS in general or with the more
specific aspects which this research was attempting to reach into, it was decided that a
questionnaire was likely to confuse the respondents more than it would benefit the
research. In light of this, the value of having a live interviewer present to explain what he
was trying to get at was considered worth the extra scheduling problems and the extra time
involved in conducting the interviews. This coupled with the tendency for more
information and insight to come out during a spoken interview than in the environment of a
respondent having to write this information down on a questionnaire clinched the decision.
The classic work of Sprague and Carlson describes four major areas for consideration
in DSS design — Representations, Operations, Memory Aids, and Control Mechanisms
(ROMC). These four areas guided the design of the interview structure for elicitation of
information from the future users — the TAOs being interviewed. [Sprague & Carlson 82]
1 . Representations
This element of the DSS is the way in which the information gleaned from the
input data is presented to the TAO. Sprague and Carlson assert that, "Any activity in a
decision-making environment takes place in the context of some conceptualization,"
[Sprague & Carlson 82 p. 102] and it is the representations which facilitate this
conceptualization. The effort here was to extract from the TAOs interviewed the best way
to show the information needed. This part of the interview revolved around the graphics,
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text, and video presentations. This is important as noted in the previous chapter because, if
presented poorly, the information may not be used at all.
This issue was approached through the use of a mockup screen made prior to the
interview and shown to the user for his critique and suggestions. This screen simulation is
reproduced in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Sample Screen To Determine Proper Method For Representation
2. Operations
The Operations component involves the performance of the software and indeed
the system as a whole from the user's perspective. Included here are the various
capabilities of the system which the decision-maker can use. He could, for instance, use
the system to ascertain the identity of the contact and also a recommended course of action
to deal with a certain contact. This aspect of the DSS is critical because if the information is
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derived too slowly or the information gleaned is not the information needed, the system
again will not be useful.
Some of this information was elicited from the TAOs through the use of a
hypothetical tradeoff graph (reproduced here as Figure 6) illustrating the possible degree of
certainty that the decision is correct, juxtaposed with the amount of time required to reach
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Figure 6. Time/Certainty Tradeoff
3 . Memory Aids
This aspect of the DSS involves the method used to remind the TAO of the
identity of a contact and other pertinent information. Sprague and Carlson point out that a
decision can often be represented in terms of its presentation. [Sprague & Carlson 82]
Here, the idea is to find the fastest, most effective method to remind the TAO with the least
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least likelihood he might misinterpret what he is seeing. This could involve a change in
symbology, a special way to flag a particular contact, text presentations, or audible signals.
One of the questions asked to determine the optimum method to remind the TAO
was, "Should the information gleaned by the system through processing the input data be
automatically presented to the TAO every so often; Or should the information determined
by the system be presented to the TAO only when he queries the system for it?"
Answers to this question would reveal an appropriate storage format as well as
important "operations" capabilities of the system.
4 . Control Mechanisms
Usually consisting of option menus or another form of user-system dialog, this
DSS component is aimed at finding the best way for the TAO to direct the efforts of his
computer assistant. Sprague and Carlson state that this element of the paradigm is
"intended to help decision makers use representations, operations, and memory to
synthesize a decision-making process based on their individual styles, skills, and
knowledge." [Sprague & Carlson 82 p. 107] It can take the form of a keyboard, a voice
control module, a mouse (or track ball, discussed later), a light pen, or a touch screen.
Here, ease of use and effectiveness of operation are key.
Goul and Tonge used this paradigm and allowed the user to choose within the
limits of some of his Representations, Operations, Memory Aids, and Control
Mechanisms. They state that "This has been shown to be effective in enhancing the
expert's understanding of and direct involvement with the inference engine used in the
system." [Goul & Tonge 87 p. 465]
One of the questions asked to discover the optimal method to be used for TAO
control of the system was, "How often should the TAO be queried for new information?
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Should he be queried at all or should he simply be able to enter information in the order he
receives it and WHEN he receives it?"
This ROMC paradigm was used to develop the structure for the TAO interviews
to be conducted (Appendix A). In fact, the interview structure was organized along the
lines of the ROMC paradigm in order to channel the interviewees' thoughts into one area at
a time.
There are areas where the distinct components become blurred, however. Where
possible, these areas were used to guide the interviewees to the next topic. In some cases,
this transition was avoided to permit a more separate examination of the topics at hand.
Representations, for instance, was not joined with Control Mechanisms despite the
common link between them - the user-system interface.
In other cases, much stronger links between areas were evident in interviews
than had been anticipated. The Operations issue led more than a few interviewees into a
discussion of Control Mechanisms.
Although this was set up as a structured interview process, these links were
pursued rather than suppressed. It is, after all, the interviewees who know best what they
want, and this freedom allowed several TAOs to generate new possibilities for the design
of the system. These ideas are discussed in Chapter Four.
C. INTERVIEW DYNAMICS
The interviewees chosen were picked at random from among the Surface Warfare
Officers in the student population of the Naval Postgraduate School with a preference for
the more experienced officers. This thesis will therefore use the intuitive reasoning that
more experience will give a better reading as to the value of a DSS in the TAO's
environment. It will work from a starting assumption that the more information derived for
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a TAO from the data available to him, the better the tactical picture he will have. And the
better the tactical picture, the better off he will be when the shooting war actually starts.
Interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 100 minutes depending on how much the
interviewees had to say. The more experienced officers consistently had the longer
interviews, and the two most senior interviewed both said that it is long overdue to have a
system out there to help the TAO. Several officers got quite animated, and their excitement
led to several of the ideas presented in Chapter 4. Not all interviews were conducted in
complete privacy, and in three non-private interviews, Naval officer passersby added
constructive comments to what they had overheard. Two of these comments proved
beneficial in the evaluation of user-system interface possibilities.
D. SUMMARY
This is not the first attempt to assist military decision-makers through the use of DSS,
but the TAO environment lacks any such help. That environment consists of numerous
complications, arising from the complexity of determining identity and subsequently hostile
intent. Although provided with assistants to help in this process, the TAO is still
confronted with a difficult problem.
In the design of the interview structure, the Representations, Operations, Memory
Aids, and Control Mechanisms paradigm was used to organize the interviews roughly
along the lines of the design of an actual system. The interviews themselves generated a
good deal of enthusiasm and valuable input for the research. The results of the interviews
and the resulting design of the system are presented in Chapter IV.
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE EFFICACY OF HOTDAM! (HART'S
OPERATIONAL TACTICAL DECISION AIDING MICROCOMPUTER)
FOR THE TAO ENVIRONMENT
Based on the TAO interviews conducted, the appropriateness of a Knowledge-Based
DSS for the problem presented by the environment of the TAO was analyzed. Most TAOs
questioned felt that such a system would be of significant benefit to them in the
environment of the developing tactical situation for use in analytic form to:
• figure out what contacts are and
• remind the TAO what the team opinion regarding the identity of the contact is and
• recommend courses of action.
Since these were in fact the experts for whom the system was being designed, the
"users," the assumptions made by the author about the need for such a system appear to
have been accurate. A more specific breakdown of the interview results follows.
A. DEMOGRAPHICS
A total of fourteen TAOs were interviewed. Of those, two had prior enlisted service,
and one is a reservist. All have stood watch as TAO, and all are U. S. naval officers.
Seven officers were Lieutenants, four were Lieutenant Commanders, and three were
Commanders. Two of the Commanders have already had command at sea.
The average years of commissioned service for the group was 10.32 (ranging from a
low of 4.5 years to a high of 23 years). The average length of time since qualified as a
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Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) was 7.8 years (with the low here being one year, and the
high being 15). The true average may actually be higher than reported since formal SWN
qualification was actually implemented only 15 years ago.
Levels of education ranged from bachelors degrees to "almost Ph.D." The major areas
of study included: Ocean Engineering (1), Analytical Management (2), Information
Systems (2), Marine Science (1), Nuclear Physics (1), Finance (1), English (1), History
(1), Electrical Engineering (1), Communications (1), Economics (2), Political Science (2),
Operations Analysis (1), Computer Science (1), Mechanical Engineering (1), and
Oceanography (1).
Most interviewees characterized themselves as able to navigate around on computers
pretty well (8), one listed his experience as extensive, three listed experience as minimal,
and two claimed experience on one specific program only.
B . INPUTS FOR THE TAO DSS
Despite the wide diversity in level of experience on computers, years of experience as
a TAO, educational background and majors, and the wide variety of ship types on which
the interviewees had served, there was a general agreement about the need for a DSS to
assist TAOs, the willingness to use such a system, and the importance of speed and of user
interface.
All of the TAOs interviewed expressed a willingness to use a system to help narrow






• have a friendly interface and
• be highly reliable.
Many of the specified characteristics of the system that the TAOs interviewed would be
comfortable with deserve a more thorough discussion in order to make it clear just why
they are necessary. In fact, these descriptions will later serve as the design criteria of such
a system.
1 . User Friendliness
Most said they thought other TAOs would use it too if it were user-friendly, if
they had had computer experience, if the system were simple to understand, if they were
"year group '65 or younger", "if they had tested the system first in a non-volatile
environment," and if the interface were unintimidating. One respondent would say only
that it is "hard to say."
2. Usefulness
Asked about how useful the TAO DSS would be, interviewees answered
everything from, "It would be an extra layer of unnecessary complexity" to that it would be
"very much of a help," with most responses indicating that helpfulness depends on speed
of response (6 TAOs specified this) or reliability (4 specified).
A breakdown of the ranking by importance to the TAO of information and
services able to be provided by the system is given in Appendix B.
3 . Modularity
The consensus seemed to be that the system should be modularized to allow the
viewing of only a particular class of target (i.e., air, surface, or subsurface) but that it
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should be switchable to other categories or to all categories with a single action (such as a
menu choice).
4 . Chaining
All TAOs agreed that the system should also be able to work backwards from an
educated guess (i.e., an intelligence report that a certain contact is in the area) until it hits
something that refutes the evidence or until the TAO is satisfied that the contact is correctly
identified.
5 . Speed Versus Accuracy
Five TAOs preferred the system give them a fast answer rather than pursuing
every possibility and coming up with the most accurate answer possible. Four preferred
the most accurate answer only, and four preferred to receive the fastest answer first
followed by a more accurate answer later. One suggested that both options be available,
selectable by menu depending on the situation. This option seems a good choice since the
opinions here were so split.
Shown the tradeoff graph of time versus certainty of identity shown as Figure 7,
most declared a separate preference for the time/certainty pairing for air targets than for
surface/subsurface targets due to the greater speed at which air scenarios develop. This
means that the inference time required for the air contacts must be reduced or that inference
time for both air and surface tracks must be improved. Half of the interviewees declared
the choices on the scale unsatisfactory and stated that the performance represented was just
too slow. One pointed out that this again is a situation-dependent performance issue. The
remainder of the results are presented in Appendix B.
6 . Non-Monotonic Versus Monotonic Reasoning
All interviewees indicated a desire to be allowed to change elements of data that







Figure 7. Time/Certainty Tradeoff
7 . Platform Specific
Eleven respondents felt that it would be valuable to make the system platform-
specific in order to exploit various sources of information that are available but frequently
not used by a ship (i.e., size of a target extrapolated from detection range from one's own
ship on a particular radar). The remaining three felt that this feature would add
unnecessarily to the cost of a "generic" system. This may be a valid point in view of
funding cuts already going into effect for the military. However, the value of the
information attainable from exploiting the data already available on each class of ship is
potentially tremendous. Such data might have prevented the downing of Iran Air flight
655, had the USS Vincennes been able to determine the size of that aircraft. In what has
been called "one of the Navy's worst nightmares come true" [Matthews 88 p. 1], perhaps
better interpretation of the available data and an unemotional evaluation of the situation
(without the stress of the current gunboat battle in progress) could have prevented the
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misidentification and engagement. A retired Navy Captain has pointed out that "With the
information he had in his hand and the time limit he was under, he did the right thing."
[Matthews 88 p. 4] It may be possible someday to provide the TAO and CO of the ships
we send into harm's way a better capability for the evaluation of the information they have
to permit a better decision in a situation where his ship is "in imminent danger." [Matthews
88 p. 18] This could result in better defense of our ships while avoiding the tragic results
of an incorrect interpretation of data.
8 . Optimal Number of Tracks
As for the optimal number of contacts for the TAO/DSS team to handle together,
the answers varied widely based on the past experience of the TAOs of the maximum
number of contacts they had had to handle. Answers ranged from 5 to 256, but a realistic
approach would be to not limit the number of contacts at all except due to hardware
constraint or to the detriment of the actual software performance. The more the computer
can keep track of, the less the TAO has to worry with. An absolute minimum should be
around 100 tracks.
9 . Man-Machine Interaction
Interviewees were about evenly split between preferences for a man-machine
dialog featuring voice interaction (7) and one featuring a mouse or track ball (6). Some
TAOs expressed a preference for more than one interface mode, resulting in votes for
keyboard interface (2), light pen (1), touch screen (1), and function keys (1), as well. One
TAO expressed a strong dislike for keyboard use, and one an extreme distaste for voice
interface. The mouse or track ball is probably the best suited to the environment and
functions to be performed by the TAO.
Pull-down menus, windows, and icons were preferred 12 to 1 over an MS-DOS
command line format with one abstainer saying, "Only testing will tell" and the other that
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this was not applicable because of his preference for natural language interface. One
answer was particularly telling, "MS-DOS would kill most TAOs," indicating that these
users would probably find that environment so user-hostile that the system would go
unused ~ an unacceptable situation.
10. Learning the System
Most interviewees expressed a preference for having a live instructor to
demonstrate the system come to each ship with the system (1 1 to 3), and most preferred a
short instruction manual with examples (8) to a detailed one (2) or a short set of
instructions with more detailed explanations in the back (4). All but one TAO thought
instruction on such a system should be given at all TAO training facilities ashore, and 10 of
those 13 thought hands-on training in laboratories was necessary, while the others felt a
brief introduction would be sufficient.
11. Willingness to Use
If this system showed up on their ships, ten TAOs said they would take the time
to learn to use it (the other 4 would be too busy), but eight interviewees said TAOs would
become too dependent on such a system; the remaining six recognize a potential problem in
that area but feel that drills and the TAO mentality would guard against this. These drills do
tend to focus on just such failures, and most TAOs have been burned often enough to
know that if such a system can fail, it will at the worst possible time. Thus, too much
dependence on the system will probably be avoided.
All interviewees felt such a system would be tremendously helpful by replacing
weapon system parameter lookups and platform weapons list lookups in Naval Warfare
Publications (NWP), even if it fulfilled no other purpose.
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12. Chauffeur
Twelve TAOs preferred to have a chauffeur to operate the system to minimize
distraction of the TAO. One TAO suggested using Junior Officers (JO -- usually O-l and
0-2) as chauffeurs; this would accomplish the same purpose with the additional advantage
of training the J.O.s. Eleven interviewees said Electronic Warfare specialists (EWs) were
an inappropriate choice for chauffeur, while three felt they were a good choice if watched
carefully. EWs are usually placed somewhere out of sight, frequently behind a curtain
making the "watch carefully" option impracticable, but the fact that this was brought up
illuminates another pertinent consideration. EWs have a reputation for being less than
completely alert due to the fact that they are seated, their job in most cases requires attention
only occasionally, and even then much of their gear is already so automated that no thought
is required. If this reputation is founded, EWs are probably a poor choice.
13. Indication of Certainty
Since the system's degree of certainty is an important consideration to the TAO
in a situation of contact identity, this should be presented to him. That is, it is crucial to the
TAO to know how sure the system is of the identification displayed to him. If the system
were only 10% certain, it would be unwise to rely solely on that identification. Normally
referred to as a Confidence Factor, this degree of certainty can be presented in a variety of
ways. Exactly half preferred a numerical percentage be presented to them, and half
preferred a graphical display such as a thermometer graph. A combination of the two could
be achieved.
Most TAOs (12) favored a TAO-initiated data input to the system with a system
query only if 15 minutes or more pass with no update to a particular contact. The others
preferred no system queries at all! It would seem prudent to have the system prompt the
TAO after several minutes to remind him of the contact's existence, even if most input was
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initiated by the TAO or chauffeur. This could help prevent simple forgetfulness from
becoming part of a potentially disastrous tactical scenario. Several suggested integrating
the system into the ship's existing combat system, but one Lieutenant Commander made
the valid and important point that this would eliminate the benefit of redundancy.
Most TAOs also expressed a need to be able to see why the system arrived at a
particular answer — what the trace of its logic was. This would improve confidence in the
system and allow the TAO to pinpoint where it is that he disagrees.
C. DESIGN OF HOTDAM!
The TAOs interviewed provided valuable input on required system performance, user-
system interface, services to be provided, modularization, methods of logic chaining,
method of database search, the necessity to change data already entered, training
capabilities, user's manual, and a need to review the logic trace the system followed to
reach a conclusion. Based on this data and on the rigors and space constraints of the at-sea
tactical environment, the HOTDAM! (Hart's Operational Tactical Decision Aiding
Microcomputer!) system was designed to best fit all of these requirements.
1 . Hardware
Mini- or Microcomputer-Based Personal computers have evolved into highly
sophisticated systems capable of handling the rigors of Knowledge-Based applications.
They are rugged, light-weight, inexpensive and readily available, allowing adaptation
without the need for shipboard modification. The new generation of microprocessors (Intel
80386 and Motorola 68030) provide the power and speed needed to handle a Knowledge-
Based DSS implementation. Should the memory requirements exceed the capacity of
personal microcomputers (even with added memory), the system could be implemented on
minicomputers with little added space requirements. The system could eventually be run
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on some of the Navy's existing combat systems computers if the system is ultimately tied
into the system. Since the microcomputer choice is preferred, this setup is illustrated as sit-
down consoles in Figure 8.
a. Keyboard Data Input and Mouse Control
In the dynamic environment of the Combat Information Center (CIC), the
TAO needs to be free from traditional keyboard data entry for speed of input and to
concentrate on the varied information presented. A voice recognition interface with large
video display would alleviate the need to be seated at a computer terminal, providing
improved flexibility. But, voice interface (at this writing) is frequently anything but user-











Figure 8. HOTDAM! in Action
Additionally, the TAO environment is probably an inappropriate place to use
such an interface since the oft-experienced tension can change the TAO/chauffeur's voice
enough to cause it to be not recognized by the system - a very undesirable result. Hence,
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keyboard entry by a chauffeur is the much more practical (and safer) way to go. A mouse
or track ball should be used for the TAO's control of and interface with the system due to
its speed and almost intuitive operation. A chauffeur would be recommended to free the
TAO from the distraction of data input, but this should not be required since some TAOs
really prefer to do it themselves (if they have time).
b. Cursor Manipulation
Much research has been done to determine the best and most efficient way
to interact with a computer. Lohr even conducted specific work to determine the best
interface for the tactical system. [Lohr 80] He favors an upside-down mouse or "track
ball" because "downward force from the palm is required in addition to angular force,
making this a very stable 'grip' generally immune to the effects of a moving platform,"
such as the pitching and rolling surface ship of the TAO's environment. He also discusses
other interface methods and points out that there is an advantage to the use of light pens
also because of their "familiar pointing action ('... want to pick that one')." But, in the
final analysis, he says, "there is no single positioning device that is ideal for all
applications, thus a general purpose tactical control system should be available with a
variety of control devices." [Lohr 80 p. 26] For two reasons the choice for HOTDAM! is
the track ball. First, it is already familiar to most TAOs since is is in current use aboard
many ships for console manipulation. Second, the track ball has already proven
satisfactory for shipboard use due to its general immunity to the inherent pitfalls of that
environment.
c. High Resolution Color Graphics Display
As Benbasat et al. found in their gaming studies, graphics are generally
more beneficial to the decision maker than text. [Benbasat et al. 81] To provide the "big
picture" the system should display the tactical scenario much like the Naval Tactical Data
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System (NTDS) with standard symbology. This pictorial summary allows the TAO to
rapidly digest the situation in concert with system-generated recommendations without the
need to learn new symbology. A flashing symbol could be used to attract attention should a
hostile contact be identified, for example, and the color of contacts should be changed to
indicate their identities (friendly, unknown, hostile). Choice of color here is important. As
Lohr points out, "Blue is six times less noticeable than green and three times less noticeable
than red." [Lohr 80 p. 27] So, if the goal is to have someone take particular note of a
contact, green is the (almost counter-intuitive) color to display it in. It is important to note
that making a contact more conspicuous can cause the dangerous side effect of confusion
particularly if something is presented in a counter-intuitive color to that in which it is
usually represented. Should this confusion turn out to be the result, the colors used should
be the intuitive ones or the color issue might be abandoned altogether. Lohr's evaluation,
however, was made with light contacts on a dark background and may not apply to the
same colors with a light background. A further intuitive point to be made here is that a
flashing contact would be more noticeable than any others. The real evaluation of efficacy
should be tested on real TAOs in a close simulation of a true Combat Information Center in
a tactical situation.
2. Software
The Knowledge-Based DSS is a hybrid creature, a blend of the best parts of both
the Expert System and the DSS. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are many views about
how exactly the various parts of such a system should interact to best assist the decision
maker. The diagram presented in the discussion there was a blend from two other
diagrams in an attempt to best present the system in light of the TAO's environment.
As the design of the system progressed after the interviews were complete, a
number of alterations to the generic idea (and the diagram presented in Chapter 2) of the
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Knowledge-Based DSS became necessary in order to incorporate the unanticipated needs
of the TAO. Among these changes were the addition of a chauffeur and his associated
keyboard interface, a relocation of the Justifier to a position immediately between the TAO
interface and the Inference Engine, and the further specification that the TAO interface be
one using Track Ball Manipulation of the cursor. This new design is presented in graphic










Figure 9. HOTDAM!, the TAO DSS
The Chauffeur is a weak link in this system — his input will only be as fast as his
typing speed, and his accuracy will only be as good as his understanding of the input data
and the direction he receives from the TAO.
While it is recognized that this represents a quantum leap in the cost of such a
system, it would be hard to place a value on the increased speed with which the system
could provide an evaluation in a situation of an approaching, possibly hostile contact in
time of doubt, confusion, and information overload. This assistance to the TAO could
prove invaluable in the evaluation of the contact, thus preventing the engagement of a
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neutral contact while ensuring the proper actions are taken against a contact showing hostile
intent.
The more specific software requirements of the HOTDAM! system are discussed
in detail below and represented graphically in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Proposed Design of HOTDAM!, the TAO DSS
a. Menu Driven with Extensive Help Function
The TAO needs direct, explicit dialog with the DSS for speed and accuracy
of interaction. As Vedder and Mason experienced, to be successful, " It should be noted
that should the funds be available to build one, an ideal system would be connected into the
various sensors of the ship and to the existing combat system in order to significantly
improve the input speed and accuracy of the data. A system used in a crisis must provide a
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terse, direct dialog. [Vedder 87] The TAO needs such dialog for speed and accuracy of
interaction with the system. This is accomplished with multiple windows and icons where
appropriate. An extensive HELP function provides a built-in tutor to guide the TAO-in-
training.
b. Novice and Expert Modes
The inexperienced TAO needs guidance to adequately train on the ES; the
veteran needs a streamlined system that enhances system operation by alleviating
extraneous interface dialog. The dual-mode approach (achieved through a simple menu
selection by the TAO) satisfies this requirement by giving the novice extensive on-line
instruction while the expert is given minimal dialog for efficient system operation. The
novice mode could be used not only to train TAOs in system use but also to train J.O.s in
important tactical thinking.
c. Multiple Threat Analysis
As with the AEGIS weapon system, analysis and tracking of multiple
targets is required to adequately fight the ship. Since the tactical DSS is not integrated with
ship sensors and weapon systems, the program will be limited only by the memory
constraints of the hardware. This is in order to improve the human information processing
limitation of "seven (plus or minus two)", espoused by Miller. [Miller 56 p. 52] Since the
TAO can keep track of about seven contacts by himself, the system will improve his
capacity by remembering them for him and by reminding him of them through visual cues
and changing symbols. Miller found that recoding can increase this capacity by allowing
groupings to assist in this remembering process. In fact, the system could be used to
recode for the TAO through such cues as symbol shape to allow better TAO processing.
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d. Rules of Engagement (ROE) Integration
ROE are guidelines promulgated by higher authority that spell out under
what circumstances we can legally engage a hostile adversary (e.g., return fire only when
fired upon). To properly advise the TAO, the ROE in effect must be integrated into the
inference engine. These rules can be modified, as needed, by trained personnel as the ship
changes operating areas (i.e., Mediterranean, Atlantic, Pacific, Persian Gulf, etc.).
e. English-like Syntax
A fourth generation programming language (e.g., ROSIE from RAND) may
be used to provide DSS code which promotes ease of software maintenance and user
understanding.
/. Modularized Construction
By using a modular concept, the system software is capable of addition and
deletion of platform-specific applications (i.e., surface warfare, airborne anti-submarine
warfare, and subsurface warfare). This provides a standard shell with rule-base modules
for various environments. Modularized construction also has the advantages that
"technological advances can be easily accommodated" and that it "greatly aids in the ability
to repair a system." [Lohr 80 p. 28]
g. Platform-Specific Data Base and Inference Engine
Each class of surface combatant has a unique suite of sensors and weapons
systems. The DSS data and rule bases will be tailored to the specific class of ship to
correctly infer weapons employment recommendations (e.g., weapons range versus target
range). This will include data on electronic signal emission, acoustics, radar signatures,
etc.
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h. Dual Mode Chaining
Because tactical situations normally require construction of the conclusion
from an extensive database of threats the system will use forward chaining. In situations
where the TAO wishes to evaluate a non-system assessment (i.e., opinion of an
experienced TAO or Intelligence Officer), backward chaining can be invoked, adding
flexibility to the system. This could be accomplished by a single menu selection for each
contact. Several systems exist today that have this capability.
i. Breadth-First Search
With the myriad threats facing our surface forces, error tolerance in target
analysis must be extremely low. In support of this requirement, a breadth-first search will
be used to consider all possible matches against data input.
j. Non-Monotonic Reasoning
The time-critical aspect of the seaborne tactical environment necessitates the
ability to reverse incorrect assumptions. Use of non-monotonic reasoning in the inference
engine will allow for this, eliminating the need to re-enter the entire data set when an error
is discovered.
k. Man-Machine Interaction
In discussing the interface between a tactical system and its user, Lohr
points out that "The interface must be easy to use, fast, and efficient." [Lohr 80 p. 25]
Vice Admiral Gravely pointed out that flexibility is a certain advantage to a system like this.
To make the system fit Huber's criterion of compatibility with the user's dss, the Integrated
Information Display system, discussed in Chapter 3, can "be modified to reflect the
operating style of an individual commander." [Gravely 83 p. 60]. Weiss points out the
importance of "minimizing the amount of typing required," a system that "suggests the
kinds of answers required" through a set of sample responses, the use of "standard
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symbology," the transparency of system logic," and "the ease of access to information."
[Weiss 86 p. 95]
As just discussed, the system will use a breadth-first search to cover all
probable target classifications. After preliminary administrative tasks (time, date, position,
system mode, and target identification code update) the user is first presented with a menu
prompting entry of target characteristic based on method of detection (e.g., Electronic
Support Measures (ESM), radar, sonar, etc.).
One should be cautioned that system output may not result in a definitive
target identification. Even after exhaustive database searches, it is possible that several
platforms will satisfy input target characteristics. The result is a listing of possible target
identifications for TAO evaluation.
3 . Is it Possible to Implement Such a System Today?
Though numerous so-called Expert System Shells are on the market, many are
appropriate for only "toy" problems. An Expert System Shell is a software package that
allows "expertise" to be put into it and used without the extra time and difficulties
associated with building the entire system from scratch. Most such systems allow the
simple insertion of the rule base and inference strategies. Examination of those Expert
System Shells known to exist narrowed the field to seventeen possibilities for the
implementation of HOTDAM!.
Several of the companies approached expressed concern about corporate spies
and were hesitant to discuss their systems with this researcher, citing "proprietary
information." This was rather a surprising response since the questions asked were not
those involving specific programming techniques but ones about whether their systems
allow both forward and backward-chaining, whether or not they use non-monotonic
51
reasoning, etc. Hence, some of the information about these systems had to be obtained
through espionage — in technical magazines!
The seventeen systems which made it through the initial screening and were
further researched are presented in Appendix C, along with the list of those five systems
which made it through the second screening process as finalists. The addresses of the
corporate makers of these five finalists are also included in Appendix C.
Personal Consultant + was noteworthy for its ease of portability to other types of
computers including mainframes, LISP workstations, IBM AT and compatibles, T I
Explorer Workstations, IBM PS/2 Models 50, 60, and 80, and Compac Deskpro 386. It
has an easily understood presentation of confidence factors, advanced graphics, and a good
explanation facility. However, it had serious shortcomings in that it is not particularly
friendly to users not already familiar with Expert Systems and seems to suffer from chronic
out-of-memory errors when dealing with large databases of information (such as will be
required by HOTDAM!).
Goldworks can brag of its ease of use, its explanation facility, its object
orientation, and its certainty factors. But, it suffers from a lack of ability to perform
knowledge-based reasoning without continual referral to DBase III4" files and seems better
suited to knowledge acquisition and more flexible inferencing than the TAO's environment
presents.
An overall winner was found in NEXPERT, which not only provides the non-
monotonic reasoning, rule-based approach, and both forward and backward chaining but
also allows for direct input from outside sensors should the HOTDAM! system ever be
expanded to incorporate direct connection to the ship's combat system. Its object-oriented
format fits nicely with the structure of the data to be included in the HOTDAM! system, and
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the multiple inheritance capability will allow for the easier structuring of the knowledge
base.
Automatic goal generation will allow the system to pursue such goals as
"Civilian Airliner," and when that goal is determined to be false to generate and pursue
another follow-on goal. Its in-depth explanatory function is available at any point during a
session. A "browsing" mechanism will allow a review of the data and would facilitate
training.
Although the system runs on IBM AT or AT compatibles under Microsoft
Windows operating environment or on the MicroVAX, its graphics and user interface are
quite similar to those of the Macintosh (and to the display represented in Figure 5).
A series of editors allows modification of rules, objects, classes, and properties
should the occasion arise. This could facilitate the easy incorporation of changes to
friendly or enemy weapons systems and to the Rules of Engagement.
Hence, it appears that the HOTDAM! system can be implemented through the
existing Expert System Shell called NEXPERT. This will allow for an easier and faster
resulting system, and provides for the further expansion of the system to include sensor
input, if and when that enhancement comes to pass.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the demographic data on the TAOs interviewed and has
examined their inputs for the characteristics of HOTDAM!. It then explored the design of
the system from hardware, software, inference engine, and interface points of view,
discussing the benefits of the various choices made.
In order to create a system that is useful and usable for a TAO, it was necessary to
look at the way a TAO makes decisions and whatever dss he uses to ensure compatibility
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and therefore usability. It is necessary to have a system rugged enough to stand up to
shipboard life, a system with an optimal data input mode and an easy to use control
mechanism.
The system must account for novices as well as experts and to allow analysis of
multiple threats simultaneously. Inferences must be made in all the ways needed by a
TAO, and the resulting recommendations must be in accordance with the effective Rules of
Engagement. In short, the system must be designed to best fit the TAO's unique
environment and information needs.
The resulting design of HOTDAM! optimizes the mix of the numerous criteria
necessary to have the best Knowledge-Based DSS possible for the TAO. The design
complete, further research was conducted to determine whether any Expert System shell on
the market today could meet the requirements posed by HOTDAM!. Happily, there were
enough qualifiers to permit a rather choosey comparison and selection of the extremely
capable NEXPERT.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis has examined the fields of DSS, ES, Knowledge-Based DSS, and the
previous efforts at crisis and emergency support by these two fields of study. It then
examined the environment of the U. S. Navy's shipboard Tactical Action Officer to
determine whether the TAO could be helped by DSS, ES, or Knowledge-Based DSS.
That environment is a complex one of multiple contacts closing the force, competing
tasks, possible information overload, electronic warfare, smart weapons, and an enemy
who is trying his best to deceive the TAO about his real identity and intentions. All of these
complications must be taken into account, all possibilities must be explored, all options
examined, and careful evaluation of the action to be taken made, all in an environment
which inhibits these things. It is this environment that may be assisted by a
microcomputer-based Decision Support System to keep track of some of this data for the
TAO, to extract valuable information from the data, and to recommend courses of action to
the TAO based on its evaluation of the situation.
In order to determine whether this would be a practical and realistic help to the TAO,
an interview structure was developed to guide interviews of real TAOs to determine
whether this was an appropriate solution to the TAO problem. The structure for the
interviews was based on the Representations, Operations, Memory Aids, and Control
Mechanisms paradigm of Sprague and Carlson in order to channel the discussion into these
vital aspects of an effective decision aid. Fourteen TAOs of varying length of experience,
time of qualification, and operational experience were interviewed to determine whether
such a system would be of perceived value to the TAO faced with identifying unknown,
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potentially hostile contacts. The respondents identified the most needed assists the system
could provide, the required information to be deduced, the necessary speed of operation,
and the best interface method.
Based on the interviews conducted, the overwhelming view appears to be that a
Knowledge-Based DSS would be a great help to TAOs. But there was a great deal of
disagreement about exacdy what help would be most beneficial to the TAO.
The small sample size may not have allowed enough screening to get a flavor for the
majority of TAOs. However, the information gathered here does provide a valuable set of
needs since those interviewed are quite experienced in the area of TAO operations. A
follow-up set of interviews could be conducted with TAOs currently serving at sea and
standing watch in the position on a day-to-day basis. These TAOs may come up with
further valuable suggestions to improve the system discussed here.
Although more research may be required to accomplish the implementation of the
system, this thesis establishes a good basis from which to work and some design criteria
which appear relatively certain based on the general agreement about their inclusion. The
following criteria must be included:
• Micro- or Minicomputer-Based
• Keyboard Data Input by a Chauffeur
• Track Ball Control by the TAO
• High Resolution Color Graphics Display
• Menu-Driven with Extensive Help Function
• Novice and Expert Modes
• Multiple Threat Analysis
• Rules of Engagement (ROE) Integration
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• English-Like Syntax in the programming language
• Allow easy modification to ROE
• Modularized Construction
• Platform- Specific Rule Base and Inference Engine
• Dual Mode (Forward and Backward) Chaining
• Breadth-First Search
• Non-Monotonic Reasoning
• As User-Friendly an Interface as Possible.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Perhaps as important a result of this thesis as the specification of these criteria, though,
is the determination from real TAOs that they unanimously felt that such a system would be
a significant help to the TAO in resolving unidentified contacts in a non-combat
environment. Knowledge-Based DSS show a great deal of promise for application to the
TAO environment. Isett found that his mockup DSS significantly helped to improve the
decision quality of the Air Force's equivalent of the TAO in crisis situations. [Isett 87]
Results of experiments involving Knowledge-Based DSS do not always show that they
help, however. Goul et al. found "no significant difference between the control group and
the group using the DSS with a complete knowledge base" in their study of strategic
planning. [Goul et al. 86 p. 82] The environment of the developing tactical scenario is
neither that of crisis nor that of true strategic planning and will probably require something
of a different approach.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because TAOs will not always be able to explain what they need prior to
implementation, a prototyping solution tested in-the-flesh by fleet TAOs is likely to be the
most successful method of implementation. An iterative development allows the system to
be honed to the razor's edge required by the TAOs of today's Navy. This prototype could
be developed by students for trials in fleet exercises or inport drills in order to get a feel for
how such a system would be evaluated under realistic conditions and show how such a
system could be made better. Such a system could be developed using the Expert System
shell NEXPERT, as determined in the final stage of this research. Naval Ocean Systems
Command (NOSC) could then assume the watch in order to fully examine the work
completed, make its evaluation and improvements, if any, and proceed with
implementation.
A danger to be avoided in the implementation of HOTDAM! is the tendency of any
bureaucracy to sometimes decide for a user what it is that the user needs and how best to
provide the services required. In order to ensure the use and usefulness of a system like
this, it is mandatory that the TAOs be consulted for their views at each step of the process
leading to completion.
A terrible waste of money, effort, and lives could result from TAOs not using this
system simply due to the fact that it does not provide what they really need. The only way
to achieve this is through iterative, adaptive development. Iterative development, or
prototyping, is supported in a number of the packages available for the development of
Expert Systems and is specifically marketed for the Personal Consultant +, Goldworks,
and NEXPERT. A possible further assurance against developing a system the TAO will
not use would be to develop prototypes using each of these systems and allow TAOs to
choose the one that most closely fits their needs. In doing this, though, care must be taken
not to evaluate the wrong criteria. A benchmark test, for instance, tests the speed to
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perform a specific task, which is really not the most important factor in a developing
scenario. A more appropriate test would be for the correctness of the solution regarding
identity and recommended action and whether the information presented without excessive
digging is the information really needed by the TAO.
The critical issue here is that a system designed to assist the TAO be appropriate for his
environment and be capable of providing him the information he needs. The only way to
accurately determine whether a design is good enough is to have fleet TAOs try it out in a
realistic environment and let these end-users decide what it is that they need.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW STRUCTURE FOR TAO INTERVIEWS
DESCRIPTION: This appendix contains the questions and discussion points used for
the structured interview technique to elicit the information for the analysis and design of the
Decision Support System (DSS) for Tactical Action Officers (TAO). This structure is
included to allow the user to view the actual questions and sequence of discussion areas
used.
INTERVIEW STRUCTURE











How many years have you been commissioned?
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How many years have you been a Surface Warfare Officer?
What, if any, combat experience do you have?




How would you characterize your background on microcomputers (none,
minimal, only on a specific program, can navigate around on them pretty
well, extensive)?
How about other computers?
If a system were available that could help you narrow the possibilities about the
identities of various contacts closing your ship (based on the information
you or someone else enters into it), would you use it?
Do you think anyone else would?
How important a help would this be to you?
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Of this list of information and services the system could provide to you, which
would be the most valuable? The intent here is to have the subject rank the
items in order of usefulness to him.
Identity of the Contact
A listing of the weapons each contact carries
A notification when you are in a particular contact's weapons
release range
A threat ranking of the various possible contacts in the area
A memory aid to provide feedback on what you and the
computer together have determined a contact to be
A reasoning tool for use in deciding on the identity for
yourself
An integrated package containing Rules of Engagement
triggers and criteria for hostile intent
A weapons employment advisor, to provide a suggestion about
which weapon and how many of them would have the best
probability of taking out a particular target
A simple EW advisor since this data is acquired first and
farthest from the contact (this would probably not provide a specific
identity except in the case of unique emitters
Should the system be modularized to allow viewing of only air targets, surface
targets, etc.?
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Or should all warfare areas always be available?
Should the system also have the capability to permit the TAO to start from an
educated guess (i.e., an intel report), then prompt the TAO for further data
to confirm or deny the contact identification?
Should the search allow for the pursuit of every possibility to prevent a false
identification or should it permit the fastest possible conclusion? Imagine a
typical identification scenario for an unknown ship.
Based on the following tradeoff chart, where would you be willing to have this








Should the system allow the used to change already entered data if it turns out to
be wrong (without having to begin the whole process all over again) and
proceed with a new set of rules?
For instance, if your EW information turned out to be a misidentification, do
you want to be able to change it and leave the rest of the information the
same and run the same contact?
Should the system be platform-specific to allow for the various characteristics of
the different sensors (such as typical radar detection range) aboard the
various friendly ships which will use such a system?
What is the optimal number of contacts for the system to hold and keep track of
for the TAO and computer to work on together? Please keep in mind the
tactical situations in which you found it most difficult to keep track of the
developing situation.
5 7 9 11 13 25 50 100
Why?
How would you as a TAO find it most beneficial to talk to your computer
assistant?
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Are pull-down menus, windows, and icons the answer, or will they be as
intimidating as an MS-DOS-like text interface?
(Here the subject is shown the attached diagram of windows and a brief










































How much of a User's Manual would you need to get started with this
system (a simple explanation of the menus and a few examples of
scenarios to run)?
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How detailed an instruction set should come with the system?Should a real
live instructor come to demonstrate and advise for a while with each
such set?
Should instruction for such a system be given at Department Head School?
How much? (none [get it on the ship], brief introduction, hands-on practice)
If such a system showed up on your ship, would you invest the time to learn to
use it?
Would TAOs become too dependent on such a system and be unable to function
without it (in case it went down)?
Would its use be more similar to that of NTDS (if it's working great, and if not,
operations go Mode IV)?
Would this system be a help in replacing NWP-lookups for determining
which ships have a certain radar combination or a certain funnel or win
configuration?
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Should the system require a chauffeur to free the TAO from the interface problem
altogether (other than talking to the chauffeur) and permit him to focus
more thoroughly on the tactical problem at hand?
Would the EWs be more likely operators for this system than the TAO? (since
they have the data first, they could consult this system and report the results
to the TAO).
Should the information gleaned by the system through processing the input data
be automatically presented to the TAO every so often? Or should the
information determined by the system be presented to the TAO only when
he queries the system for it?
Should the status display give a measure of progress toward a conclusion?
(Here the subject is shown a series of thermometer sort of graphs, filling
up as the identity becomes more certain.)
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95 % and above




How often may the TAO be queried for new information?
Should he simply be able to enter information in the order he receives it and
WHEN he receives it?
Should a form for each contact in question be presented on the screen (which
would look somewhat like a fill-in-the-blank form) into which the TAO
could enter whatever data he has for that contact?
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Should this be in response to some action by the TAO or chauffeur (for instance,
when he gets new data), or should it be initiated by the system after a certain




SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
DESCRIPTION: This appendix contains the remainder of the interview results not
discussed in the actual text of this thesis. These data are included to allow a complete
review of the results by the reader. This permits an independent evaluation of the project.
VALUE TO THE TAO OF SERVICES PROVIDED
The data represented below is the number of incidents of a certain ranking for each of
the services or information the TAOs were asked to prioritize in value of that particular
service/information to them. The numbers to the right of the double line indicate the
number of TAOs who assigned the service provided by the system the priority indicated in
the leftmost column. For instance, four respondents indicated that the system's ability to































1 4 3 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 3 2 3 2
3 3 1 5 1 1
4 2 2 3 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 2 5
6 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2
7 3 4 1 3
8 1 1 4 3 1 1
9 2 2 2 5
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APPENDIX C
SEVENTEEN EXPERT SYSTEMS SHELLS INVESTIGATED
AND THE FIVE FINALISTS
DESCRIPTION: The following seventeen names are the expert systems which made
it through the initial screening and which were further investigated to determine the five
finalists, which are listed below with their corporate makers and the addresses of the
makers.
The seventeen systems which made it through the initial screening and were further
researched are:
• XSYS by California Intelligence
• OPS5+ by Computer * Thought Corporation
• ESP Advisor by Expert Systems International
• Arity by Arity Corporation
• Expert Edge by Human Edge Software Co.
• Expert-Ease by Expert Systems Incorporated
• EXSYS by EXSYS, Inc.
• TTMM (The Intelligent Machine Model) by General Research
• Insight 2+ by Level Five Research, Inc.
• Guru by Micro Data Base Systems, Inc.
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• Advisor by Ultimate Media
• Insight by Jeffrey Perrone and Associates, Inc.
• M.l by Teknowledge, Inc.
• SuperExpert by Softsync, Inc.
• PC Scheme by Texas Instruments
• Personal Consultant"1" by Texas Instruments
• Goldworks by Gold Hill Computers, Inc.
• NEXPERT by Neuron Data, Inc.
The five systems which checked out for having the ability to match the
criteria determined for the design of HOTDAM! are:





Personal Consultant"*" by Texas Instruments
P. O. Box 655012, Mail Station 57
Dallas, TX
75265
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